Black Hat USA 2013

Black Hat USA is the most famous conference for IT security professionals and hackers around the globe. The highly skilled speakers provide insights into their ongoing research and release their brand new tools. Of course, the spectacular location at Caesars Palace in Las Vegas contributes to the popularity of this conference as well. This year’s event was particularly special for us because Cyrill Brunschwiler, CTO of Compass Security and passionate penetration tester, was honored to contribute his own talk about the security of the upcoming wireless metering protocol. Thomas Röthlisberger and Sascha Herzog, IT Security Analysts and penetration testers of Compass Security, accompanied his journey and report about the newest trends and their conclusion of the Black Hat USA 2013 in the following paper:

http://www.csnc.ch/misc/files/2013/blackhat_2013_v1_0.pdf

On one hand, this year’s talks did not necessarily reveal revolutionary topics or many new vulnerabilities. Especially in well-known areas like web security, the conference leaves the feeling that we kind of reached the zenith. On the other hand, the known attacks are enhanced with new creative exploiting techniques and helpful tools, which penetration testers will love. Furthermore, topics like hardware hacking and digital forensics have been very popular this year.

blackhatusa2013

Access control in Windows

According to [Access Control, 2013], Access control refers to security features that control who [sic] can access resources in the operating system. Applications call access control functions to set who can access specific resources or control access to resources provided by the application.”

The Windows access control model is founded on two base components: access tokens and security descriptors. The relations and interactions between them are illustrated in the schema below, based on [Parts of the Access Control Model, 2013], [Access Tokens, 2013] and [Securable Objects, 2013].

Access Token visualisation

The following items of the schema were therefore further studied:

  • Security identifiers (SIDs) are unique and used to identify a trustee. SIDs are assigned by Active Directory for users within a Windows domain. Various well-known SIDs exist and while SIDs should not be used directly, they are consultable for everybody and their randomness or secrecy is not a security prerequisite [Security Identifiers, 2013]. SIDs are also used to identify logon sessions and are kept unique while a computer is running. The list of previously issued logon SIDs is reset on the reboot of the computer [Security Glossary – L, 2013].
  • Restricted tokens are copies of primary or impersonation access tokens with fewer enabled permissions. Compared to its original access token, a restricted token may contain fewer privileges, have the deny-only attribute set or specify a list of restricting SIDs [Restricted Tokens, 2013].
  • Primary versus impersonation tokens: a primary token is created by the operating system either on a user logon or when the user starts a process. An impersonation token is created when a server-side process captures the identity of a client and impersonates this client identity during the execution of the task. A server-side process using impersonation will have two tokens: first its primary token and a second impersonation token featuring details of the client. Moreover, an impersonation token has one of four different levels of impersonation: anonymous, identify, impersonate and delegate [Lebrun, 2013].

None of the above objects implement cryptography. No crypto-based verification is implemented in the checking process documented either [How AccessCheck Works, 2013].

 

Offline references

[Lebrun, 2013]: Lebrun, M. (2013, July-August). Faiblesse des mécanismes d’autentification: quelles solutions? MISC – Multi-System & Internet Securitry Cookbook(68), page 12-21.

Embedded devices and cell phone flash memory acquisition using JTAG

Back in Black (back from Black Hat with a bag full of schwag and branded black shirts). 

Black Hat and DEF CON again allowed insights into latest research and concerns. Where some topics loose grip ( vulnerability scanning, IPv4, DNS, general web issues) others gain momentum (DDoS, mobile computing, smart energy, industrial control and embedded systems). Myself was speaking on the advanced metering infrastructure and specifically on the security of the wireless M-Bus protocol. Slide deck and whitepaper are available for download from the Compass Security news page[1].

At that time, I would like to let you know about a little invention that makes reversing of embedded systems and industrial control devices partially easier. JTAGulator [2]. A device designed by Joe Grand, aka Kingpin and former DEF CON badge designer, with the sole purpose of identifying JTAG PINs and UART serial lines on printed circuit boards (PCB). There is no need to unomunt or desolder devices. JTAGulator can be configured to run on a range of voltages (1.2-3.3V) and features 24 I/Os that are arbitrarily connected to the board in order to identify the relevant pins. Note, that testing for the valid pinout might cause your little device behave strangely while JTAGulator tries to pull lines up and down. Thus, make sure you stay in safe distance 🙂

Now, you wonder !!!@#$ JTAG!!!…understandably. Joint Test Action Group[3], is the name for a standardized hardware interface (IEEE 1149.1) that allows to test and debug integrated circuits. Most embedded devices (cell phones, wireless routers, …) nowadays implement the interface. Having enough information of the target device, the chip and its peripherals could be initialized and accessed using the JTAG interface. Specifically, the interface could allow access to flash memory contents. Thus, the technology comes in handy to acquire cell phone data on a low level or to extract the firmware of embedded devices.

JTAG interfaces are small boxes that interface between the embedded hardware and a common computer. For example, the Swiss based company Amontec[4] provides a high-speed general purpose interface at low cost (120 Euros). The box and its drivers are compatible with the OpenOCD software[5] an on-chip debugger that allows for programming and debugging of embedded devices using some specific command set and the GNU debugger[6]. The Android community[7] has adopted the approach for debug purposes of the Android kernel [8].

With that, I leave you for the moment and I promise we get back to you soon with more summaries on topics of interest.

References
[1] Slides and Whitepaper wireless M-Bus Security, http://www.csnc.ch/en/modules/news/news_0088.html
[2] JTAGulater, http://www.grandideastudio.com/portfolio/jtagulator/
[3] JTAG, http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/1149.1-1990.html
[4] Amontec, http://www.amontec.com/
[5] OpenOCD, http://openocd.sourceforge.net/
[6] GNU Debugger, http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/
[7] Android Kernel, http://source.android.com/source/building-kernels.html
[8] Video Android Kernel Debugging, http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=JzMj_iU4vx