Compass Security Blog

Offensive Defense

Device Code Phishing – Add Your Own Sign-In Methods on Entra ID

TL;DR An attacker is able to register new security keys (FIDO) or other authentication methods (TOTP, Email, Phone etc.) after a successful device code phishing attack. This allows an attacker to backdoor the account (FIDO) or perform the self-service password reset for the account with the newly registered sign-in methods. Microsoft deemed this not a vulnerability.

Continue reading

No Passwords More Problems

Passwordless products promise greater security and convenience by allowing users to log in to Windows systems with only their smartphone. But what is going on behind the scenes and how could a domain’s security stance be worsened by such a solution? In this post I will explain how these products are implemented and detail the vulnerabilities and weaknesses discovered in three tested products.

Continue reading

SAML Padding Oracle

ArcGIS [1] is a family of software providing geographic information system services. While testing a customer’s ArcGIS architecture we came across a SAML login flow. In this blogpost we show how we found and exploited an AES-CBC padding oracle in this flow.

Continue reading

Ionic Identity Vault Biometric Authentication Bypass

During a customer project, we could bypass the biometric authentication mechanism of Ionic Identity Vault on Android, because the Android KeyStore entry does not require any authentication. This post shows how this was done and how it can be exploited.

Continue reading

Relaying NTLM authentication over RPC

Since a few years, we – as pentesters – (and probably bad guys as well) make use of NTLM relaying a lot for privilege escalation in Windows networks.

In this article, we propose adding support for the RPC protocol to the already great ntlmrelayx from impacket and explore the new ways of compromise that it offers.

This vulnerability was discovered by Compass Security in January 2020, disclosed to Microsoft Security Response Center and assigned CVE-2020-1113 as identifier.

Continue reading

SAMLRequest Support for SAML Raider

About a year ago, the Burp extension SAML Raider [0] was released as a result of a bachelor thesis [1] in collaboration with Compass Security. This Burp extension automates most of the steps, which are necessary to test a SAML single sign-on process and perform according attacks. With SAML Raider, an authentication bypass vulnerability in a Service […]

Continue reading

Presentation on SAML 2.0 Security Research

Compass Security invested quite some time last year in researching the security of single sign-on (SSO) implementations. Often SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) is used to implement a cross-domain SSO solution. The correct implementation and configuration is crucial for a secure authentication solution. As discussed in earlier blog articles, Compass Security identified vulnerabilities in SAML […]

Continue reading

Aftermath of the Netgear Advisory Disclosure

Update – 13.10.2015: Netgear published a new firmware (version 1.1.0.32) which fixes the reported authentication bypass. My most recently appointed colleague, Daniel Haake, described in the previous blog article “Authentication Bypass in Netgear WNR1000v4 Router” how he found an authentication bypass in commonly used Netgear firmwares. Due to the rediscovery of the issue and its […]

Continue reading

Authentication Bypass in Netgear WNR1000v4 Router

Three months ago I tested the web interface of the Netgear WNR1000v4 router for some typical vulnerabilities. When playing around with the application by forcefully calling different URLs in contexts it was not meant for, I got some strange, but interesting behaviour. I accessed different URLs and then switched back to the root web directory […]

Continue reading

SAML SP Authentication Bypass Vulnerability in nevisAuth

Two months ago, we wrote about SAML Raider, a Burp extension which allows automating SAML attacks based on manipulations of the intercepted security assertion. Using this tool, we were able to identify a severe vulnerability in the service provider (SP) implementation of AdNovum‘s nevisAuth. The following conditions make exploitation possible: SAML POST-Binding is used, i.e. […]

Continue reading

« Older posts