Some months ago, I performed a web application penetration test on an application that used passkey for authentication. As part of the assessment, I also tested the passkey implementation and noticed some unusual behavior. During the debugging process, I created two short JavaScript helper functions that can be used to hook the browser APIs involved in passkey operations, allowing the passkey configuration to be inspected and manipulated. This gave me the ability to reliably perform some passkey tests and assess the configuration and implementation.
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SSH is a widely used protocol that provides secure access to remote systems. It enables encrypted communication, file transfers, command execution and shell access for system administration.
Visit https://sshlabs.compass-security.training to learn more about SSH security.
In a previous blog post, we explored the technical side of passkeys (also known as discoverable credentials or resident keys), what they are, how they work, and why they’re a strong alternative to passwords. Today, we’ll show how passkeys are used in the real world – by everyday users and security professionals alike.
Don’t we all know the hassle of managing loads of passwords, trying to come up with secure and unique ones only to try afterwards to remember them? Or always staying on high alert whether the URL is definitely the valid one for the website we are trying to visit?
What if all this could be over soon?
Welcome to Passkeys!
SAML Raider is a Burp Suite extension and the tool of choice for many pentesters for testing SAML infrastructures. This blog post should give a brief introduction to what has changed in the new version 2.0.0. From Improving developer and user experience to bug fixes.
Authentication and authorization are critical components of any application. Various standards and frameworks have been developed to facilitate the development of such components and make applications more secure. Among them, JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) have become popular choice over the years.
In this article, we discuss commons flaws in JWT-based authentication and present our extension to automatically check for these issues in Burp: JWT-scanner.
TL;DR An attacker is able to register new security keys (FIDO) or other authentication methods (TOTP, Email, Phone etc.) after a successful device code phishing attack. This allows an attacker to backdoor the account (FIDO) or perform the self-service password reset for the account with the newly registered sign-in methods. Microsoft deemed this not a vulnerability.
Passwordless products promise greater security and convenience by allowing users to log in to Windows systems with only their smartphone. But what is going on behind the scenes and how could a domain’s security stance be worsened by such a solution? In this post I will explain how these products are implemented and detail the vulnerabilities and weaknesses discovered in three tested products.
ArcGIS [1] is a family of software providing geographic information system services. While testing a customer’s ArcGIS architecture we came across a SAML login flow. In this blogpost we show how we found and exploited an AES-CBC padding oracle in this flow.
During a customer project, we could bypass the biometric authentication mechanism of Ionic Identity Vault on Android, because the Android KeyStore entry does not require any authentication. This post shows how this was done and how it can be exploited.
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