Compass Security Blog

Offensive Defense

Page 21 of 28

Lync – Missing Security Features

Microsoft has published a list of key security features [1] and also their security framework [2] for the Lync Server 2013. Those documents show how deeply MS integrated their SDL in the Lync products. It also indicates that Lync provides a solid security base out of the box: Encryption enforced for all communication between Lync […]

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Lync – Privacy Configuration

We have shortly described the Lync federations in a previous post. With the usage of federations the question comes about the privacy and the security of the user’s information (e.g. presence information). There are scenarios where an employee doesn’t answer the phone but is mentioned as “available” in Lync. This could lead to a misunderstanding […]

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Lync – Top 5 Security Issues

Microsoft Lync Server (a combination of “link” and “sync”, see [6]) communications software offers instant messaging (IM), presence, conferencing, and telephony solutions. Lync can be integrated with SharePoint or Exchange to extend its functionalities. Users can e.g. search for specific skills within the Lync client when SharePoint integration is enabled. Exchange is used as a […]

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Advisories regarding Leed and Secure Entry Server (SES)

Today I’m happy to release the following security advisories: SQL injection in Leed (CSNC-2013-005 / CVE-2013-2627) Cross-site request forgery in Leed (CSNC-2013-006 / CVE-2013-2628 Authentication bypass in Leed (CSNC-2013-007 / CVE-2013-2629) URL redirection in Secure Entry Server (SES) I would take the opportunity to thanks Valentin CARRUESCO aka Idleman for the timely patches he implemented […]

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Compass SSL/TLS recommendations

Mozilla created an extensive page [7] concerning the best current choice of SSL/TLS cipher suites, primarily for web servers. Compass Security agrees broadly with the article, but recommends some additional restrictions in order to provide the most resistance against active and passive attacks versus TLS secured connections: Use 3DES cipher instead of RC4 Disable SSLv3 support […]

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SuisseID-basierte Authentisierung mit Apple OS X

Apple veröffentliche 2006 ein Setup-Guide für die Benutzung von OS X mit Smartcards. Die Anleitung basiert auf der Version 10.4 ist somit nicht mehr aktuell. Die Prinzipien sind allerdings nach wie vor anwendbar und benötigen nur ein paar wenige Anpassungen, wie das folgende Proof-of-Concept zeigt. Es existieren drei Möglichkeiten unter OS X die Smartcard mit […]

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ASFWS slides and OWASP meeting tomorrow

As announced a while ago, I had the chance to organize both a workshop about our hacking-lab.com and present my talk “Advances in secure (ASP).NET development – break the hackers’ spirit” at the AppSec Forum Western Switzerland in Yverdon-les-Bains last week. I hope to soon summarize the conferences I attended in an upcoming blog article. […]

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Compass Security at ASFWS in Yverdon-les-Bains

Compass Security is proud to be part and sponsor of the Application Security Forum – Western Switzerland (ASFWS), a conference about application, identity and cyber security which will be take place in a week’s time in Yverdon-les-Bains (15-16 October 2013). I will run the AppSec Lab 1 (featuring the Hacking-Lab), on Wednesday 16 October in the […]

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Introduction to Windows Exploits

As part of the Compass research week, I dived into Windows exploit development. Conclusion is, that the basic exploiting principles from unix also apply on Windows. The biggest difference is the availability of much more advanced security tools, primarily debuggers and system analysis utilities, and some additional attack vectors like SEH. Also different versions of […]

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Bypass File Download Restrictions in Content Filters

Companies battle with users who download files from the Internet at work and then execute them. Unsuspicious files are often infected with malware. A common procedure to decrease the amount of infections is to block common bad file types (for example .exe, .scr or .zip), before the files can enter the internal network. The preconditions […]

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