While not new, a self-referencing LNK file in combination with winget configuration instructions can be a viable initial access payload for environments where the Microsoft Store is not disabled.
While not new, a self-referencing LNK file in combination with winget configuration instructions can be a viable initial access payload for environments where the Microsoft Store is not disabled.
Red Teaming engagements are “realistic” attack simulations designed to test the security posture of an organization and its Blue Team. This term is used in many different ways, so if you’re not sure where to draw the line, Michael Schneier’s latest blog post provides a good comparison of different types of assessment. Anyway, when doing […]
During Business Email Comproise (BEC) engagements we often have to analyze the provenance of emails. According to the FBI’s Internet Crime Report, BEC is one of the most financially damaging attacks, even surpassing ransomware in terms of losses. But how can we know all of this? Through email headers! This blog post tries to shed some light on the information contained within emails, what it means, and what can be done to prevent this type of attack.
TL;DR An attacker is able to register new security keys (FIDO) or other authentication methods (TOTP, Email, Phone etc.) after a successful device code phishing attack. This allows an attacker to backdoor the account (FIDO) or perform the self-service password reset for the account with the newly registered sign-in methods. Microsoft deemed this not a vulnerability.
Device code phishing is nothing new. In fact it has been around for some years now. Despite the awesome capabilities of device code phishing, it is not widely used by threat actors. Therefore, it probably does not receive much attention from Microsoft. Compass Security is releasing two tools that can work hand in hand in a device code phishing exercise or even your next red team engagement.
More and more companies use Microsoft 365, well even we at Compass-Security use it internally. Moving to the cloud solves many issues that our DFIR team had to deal with in the past years. Managed infrastructure means no ProxyShell, Hafnium, etc. We’re grateful for that.
Email authentication and security is another complex topic that was often misconfigured in the past. We often could send phishing email in the name of our clients during assessments. Office 365 makes the life of scammers and phishers somehow harder. We’re also grateful for that.
However we still encounter some O365 environments where it’s possible to send spoofed emails. Why is that, you ask? We also wondered and dug into the O365 features and settings!
When attackers try to access confidential data, to steal money or simply to disrupt a business, they will often look for the weakest link to get inside a target network. In some case, this might be an outdated system exposed to the internet or an easy physical access to the network but quite often, the […]
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