Depending on the customer’s preference, possible initial access vectors in our red teaming exercises typically include deployment of dropboxes, (device code) phishing or a stolen portable device. The latter is usually a Windows laptop protected by BitLocker for full disk encryption without pre-boot authentication i.e. without a configured PIN or an additional key file. While […]
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Offensive Defense
Red Team Operator. A hype-tagged role tag for which one question hits our corporate LinkedIn inbox very often. “Hey there, how can I become a Red Team Operator? Yours sincerely, a recent graduate.” To us, this is like asking how to become a regular starter on a Premier League football team. There’s nothing wrong with […]
Introducing a certipy parse command to perform stealthy offline AD CS enumeration based on local registry data.
This blog post introduces our new custom queries for BloodHound Community Edition (CE) and explains how you can use them effectively to analyze your Active Directory infrastructure. TL;DR: Check out our new BloodHound CE custom queries! Active Directory and BloodHound The majority of our customers run a Microsoft Active Directory infrastructure, either exclusively on-prem or […]
Red Teaming engagements are “realistic” attack simulations designed to test the security posture of an organization and its Blue Team. This term is used in many different ways, so if you’re not sure where to draw the line, Michael Schneier’s latest blog post provides a good comparison of different types of assessment. Anyway, when doing […]
In this blog article, we would like to share key insights from the “Defeating Microsoft’s Default BitLocker Implementation” security training by Hands-On Security and emphasize the potential risks and consequences associated with this attack technique. Our target audience includes businesses looking to safeguard sensitive data on their Windows devices, as well as individuals with an elevated requirement for protecting their data.
TL;DR An attacker is able to register new security keys (FIDO) or other authentication methods (TOTP, Email, Phone etc.) after a successful device code phishing attack. This allows an attacker to backdoor the account (FIDO) or perform the self-service password reset for the account with the newly registered sign-in methods. Microsoft deemed this not a vulnerability.
With the rise of remote working, Microsoft Teams has become the de-facto standard for video conferences, chat, and collaboration. The nature of the Teams architecture are some central systems that route information between parties. With that comes that Teams client software must be allowed to communicate to the Internet. Microsoft even recommends letting Teams traffic bypass inspection proxies for compatibility reasons. Its network communication pattern has significant overlap with malicious C2 traffic und thus it is nearly impossible for blue teams to spot adversary communication. Therefore, Teams is an interesting candidate to be abuses for C2 traffic. Thus, we put some research into this.
Sometimes, the good old credential dumping techniques just won’t work. This is the story of how a bad actor could dump credentials on a fully-patched, monitored and hardened workstation.
Red Teaming exercises are getting popular with the growth of security operations centers. These attack simulations aim to help companies improve their defenses and train the blue team. But solid foundations are necessary to get the most of such an exercise.
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