Compass Security Blog

Offensive Defense

Stealthy AD CS Reconnaissance

Introducing a certipy parse command to perform stealthy offline AD CS enumeration based on local registry data.

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BloodHound Community Edition Custom Queries

This blog post introduces our new custom queries for BloodHound Community Edition (CE) and explains how you can use them effectively to analyze your Active Directory infrastructure. TL;DR: Check out our new BloodHound CE custom queries! Active Directory and BloodHound The majority of our customers run a Microsoft Active Directory infrastructure, either exclusively on-prem or […]

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A Nifty Initial Access Payload

Red Teaming engagements are “realistic” attack simulations designed to test the security posture of an organization and its Blue Team. This term is used in many different ways, so if you’re not sure where to draw the line, Michael Schneier’s latest blog post provides a good comparison of different types of assessment. Anyway, when doing […]

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Microsoft BitLocker Bypasses are Practical

In this blog article, we would like to share key insights from the “Defeating Microsoft’s Default BitLocker Implementation” security training by Hands-On Security and emphasize the potential risks and consequences associated with this attack technique. Our target audience includes businesses looking to safeguard sensitive data on their Windows devices, as well as individuals with an elevated requirement for protecting their data.

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Device Code Phishing – Add Your Own Sign-In Methods on Entra ID

TL;DR An attacker is able to register new security keys (FIDO) or other authentication methods (TOTP, Email, Phone etc.) after a successful device code phishing attack. This allows an attacker to backdoor the account (FIDO) or perform the self-service password reset for the account with the newly registered sign-in methods. Microsoft deemed this not a vulnerability.

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Microsoft Teams Covert Channels Research

With the rise of remote working, Microsoft Teams has become the de-facto standard for video conferences, chat, and collaboration. The nature of the Teams architecture are some central systems that route information between parties. With that comes that Teams client software must be allowed to communicate to the Internet. Microsoft even recommends letting Teams traffic bypass inspection proxies for compatibility reasons. Its network communication pattern has significant overlap with malicious C2 traffic und thus it is nearly impossible for blue teams to spot adversary communication. Therefore, Teams is an interesting candidate to be abuses for C2 traffic. Thus, we put some research into this.

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Compiling a Mimikatz Module for Dumping Citrix Credz

Sometimes, the good old credential dumping techniques just won’t work. This is the story of how a bad actor could dump credentials on a fully-patched, monitored and hardened workstation.

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Level-up your Detection Game

Red Teaming exercises are getting popular with the growth of security operations centers. These attack simulations aim to help companies improve their defenses and train the blue team. But solid foundations are necessary to get the most of such an exercise.

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Relaying NTLM authentication over RPC again…

A little bit over a year ago, I wrote an article on this blog about CVE-2020-1113 and how it enabled to execute code on a remote machine through relaying NTLM authentication over RPC triggering a scheduled task on the remote system. History repeats itself and a vulnerability of the same category has been fixed by Microsoft in June this year.

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Printer Tricks Episode II – Attack of the Clones

We show how to decrypt passwords from the configuration backup of a Xerox WorkCentre and how, during the reverse engineering, a command injection vulnerability was discovered (CVE-2021-27508).

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